building off of an important line of scholarship on the long-standing difference between public rights and private rights. While Justice Thomas's proposal is not yet fully developed, it may provide a theoretically satisfying way to make sense of the Court's approach to statutory standing. Even if his answers are not perfect, they are answers to the right questions, which will reframe the problem of standing in a helpful way. Justice Thomas's concurrence may be one of the most fruitful things to happen to standing at the Supreme Court in many years.
The rest of this article explains the problem of standing in the face of Congress's creation of statutory rights. Part I describes the basic problem and the prior cases that address it. Part II describes the Court's attempted answer in Spokeo. Part III argues that Spokeo's answer is unhelpful and even problematic, and could have ominous implications for the law of privacy and other areas of substantive law. Part IV shows why Justice Thomas may have provided a better way forward.
I. The Problem of Standing to Enforce Statutory Rights
The Constitution gives federal courts the "judicial" power to decide "cases" or "controversies."
3 It is black letter law that these terms require the case to be between the proper sorts of parties, ones who have some legal dispute that the court can resolve. A key part of this requirement is that the plaintiff have "standing" to sue, which means-says the Court-that the plaintiff must have suffered (or be likely to suffer) a "concrete, particularized" "injury" (or sometimes "injury in fact"); that the injury must be "fairly traceable to the challenged action"; and that the injury must be "redressable by a favorable ruling." be seen as jurisdictional or part of the merits of the claim, 7 and of whether "standing" and "injury in fact" are novel concepts or old ones in new language. 8 But these requirements of standing doctrine have grown relatively settled despite the debates.
Beyond this settlement, however, the Court's standing cases have equivocated about an important question lying behind those requirements. What relationship do statutes have to the injury needed for standing? Is the violation of a statutory right an injury? To ask these questions is not to doubt that injury is a requirement-it is now taken as a given that injury is required. 9 Rather the question is what law defines that injury. To what extent is it shaped by ordinary law, and therefore by Congress, and to what extent is it instead hard-coded in Article III?
In two mostly separate lines of reasoning, the Court has said on the one hand that the content of an injury is shaped by law, and therefore by Congress; and said on the other hand that some congressional attempts to do so are unconstitutional. The two lines of reasoningwhich I will, unoriginally, call Proposition A and Proposition B 10 -have coexisted for some time, but they are in tension.
a. "congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing" This first branch of the Court's cases reflects a seemingly simple intuition: Legislatures create rights. Invasions of those rights are injuries. To consider an obvious example, it might be that no private person has standing to sue over misuse of a piece of public property, owned in common by the public. But if the legislature parcels up that property into private plots, each new owner has standing to litigate their own private property rights against intruders.
11
Various early cases in England and America featured this basic intuition that invasion of legal rights was necessarily an injury. As early as the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, English courts had allowed suits for trespass (to persons and to property) even when there had been no damage and no injury in fact apart from the legal injury of the trespass itself.
12 And in America, Joseph Story affirmed an expanded version of this principle when allowing downstream mill owners to sue an upstream mill owner for illegal diversion of water. 13 Surveying the precedents, he concluded: "whenever there is a clear violation of a right, it is not necessary in an action of this sort to show actual damage; that every violation imports damage; and if no other be proved, the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict for nominal damages." 14 It took longer for this principle to appear explicitly in Supreme Court cases about standing, perhaps in part because the language of modern standing doctrine did not appear until the twentieth century. In any event, in the twentieth century, the Court reaffirmed that legal rights are sufficient to ground standing. Moreover, they were sufficient to do so even in the case of rights unknown to the common law.
For instance, in Trafficante v Metropolitan Life Insurance, the Court found standing for two tenants of an apartment building to challenge their landlord's illegally discriminatory rental practices. 15 The tenants had obviously not themselves been denied the ability to rent there (that is why they were tenants), but they wanted to live in a more racially mixed apartment building and thought the law gave them a right to do so. Even though such a right would not have existed at the common law, it was enough for standing.
To be sure, it is not clear that the statutory right was the only source of standing, since the plaintiffs had also named other injuries, such as the loss of "social benefits," "missed business and professional advantages," and the "embarrassment and economic damage . . . from being 'stigmatized' as residents of a 'white ghetto. '" 16 But the majority did not spend time substantiating these consequences. And four Justices wrote separately to emphasize their reliance on the statutory right: "Absent the Civil Rights Act of 1968, I would have great difficulty in concluding that petitioners' complaint in this case presented a case or controversy within the jurisdiction of the District Court under Art. III of the Constitution. But with that statute purporting to give all those who are authorized to complain to the agency the right also to sue in court, I would sustain the statute." 17 The Court relied on this proposition most explicitly in Havens Realty v Coleman, where it considered (among other things) the rights of Sylvia Coleman, a black Fair Housing Act "tester."
18 Coleman had been told, apparently falsely and because of her race, that there were no apartments available to rent, and she sued for the violation of the Fair Housing Act's "steering" provisions. Even though she had no intent to actually rent from the defendants, the Court found that she had standing to sue. The key was the injury to her statutory rights to truthful and nondiscriminatory information.
As the Court put it:
Congress has thus conferred on all "persons" a legal right to truthful information about available housing. This congressional intention cannot be overlooked in determining whether testers have standing to sue. As we have previously recognized, the actual or threatened injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of "statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing." . . . In the instant case, respondent Colemanthe black tester-alleged injury to her statutorily created right to truthful housing information. . . . If the facts are as alleged, then respondent has suffered "specific injury" from the challenged acts of petitioners, and the Art. III requirement of injury in fact is satisfied.
19
The holding in Havens relied on similar statements the Court had repeatedly made in dicta: For instance, it had said that "Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute" 20 Not all applications of the principle are dicta, either. For instance, in Hardin v Kentucky Utilities, the Court noted that it had "repeatedly held that the economic injury which results from lawful competition cannot, in and of itself, confer standing on the injured business."
24 But the Court also pointed to a different line of cases that recognized standing for injured competitors "when the particular statutory provision invoked does reflect a legislative purpose to protect a competitive interest." 25 Hardin found standing on that basis, which works only because Congress can create rights against competitive injuries that support standing.
Similarly, in FEC v Akins, the Court held that a group of voters had standing to challenge the Federal Election Commission's refusal to subject the American Israel Public Affairs Committee to various disclosure requirements. 26 The Court concluded that the voters' "inability to obtain information . . . that, on respondents' view of the law, the statute requires that AIPAC make public" was enough to satisfy Article III's standing requirements. It admitted that a similar injury had not been enough for standing in United States v Richardson, where the Court had rejected a taxpayer's demand for information about CIA expenditures. 27 from the kind of harm they say they have suffered, i.e., failing to receive particular information about campaign-related activities."
28
While the Court noted other differences between the cases, the statute seemed to be the crux of it: 29 "failing to receive particular information" was itself a constitutionally sufficient injury in Akins, but not in Richardson, because of the right created by Congress.
Similar logic presumably supports standing in cases under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), where individuals may request information from the government and sue if it is denied. 30 The only injury in such cases is the denial of information, as in Akins and Richardson, but the Court has said in dictum that FOIA plaintiffs need show only "that they sought and were denied specific agency records," 31 and it continues to decide FOIA cases without demanding any more.
32
As we will see, these and other cases led many lower courts to think of Proposition A as presenting the general rule of standing: that a statutory cause of action created by Congress necessarily creates a right, the invasion of which satisfied Article III's requirement of injury. 33 b. "a hard floor of article iii jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute" Despite the Court's widespread use of statutory rights as a basis for Article III standing, the Court has also sometimes adverted to Article III limits on those rights. That is, it has found that federal courts 28 Akins, 524 US at 22. 29 lack constitutional power to hear certain lawsuits, even when Congress has tried to create an enforceable legal right and that legal right has been violated.
The most famous case in this second line is Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, an opinion written by the late Justice Scalia that denied standing to an environmental group whose members wished to challenge a regulation under the Endangered Species Act. 34 (The regulation had interpreted Section 7(a)(2) of the Act, 35 which required interagency consultation to avoid harm to endangered and threatened species, to apply only to actions taken in the United States or on the high seas.
36
) Some of the group's theories of standing turned on claims that the regulation would injure their ability to see or study various animals. The Court rejected these as "pure speculation and fantasy." 37 This required the Court to turn to the more lasting issue: whether Congress had created a right to those procedures, the invasion of which could support standing.
The argument had persuaded the D.C. Circuit, and the Court summarized it as follows: that, because § 7(a)(2) requires interagency consultation, the citizen-suit provision [16 USC § 1540(g)] creates a procedural right to consultation in all persons-so that anyone can file suit in federal court to challenge the Secretary's (or presumably any other official's) failure to follow the assertedly correct consultative procedure, notwithstanding his or her inability to allege any discrete injury flowing from that failure.
38
The Court seemed to assume for purposes of the case that the statute had indeed created such a right (though the opinion cast some aspersions by describing it as "an abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental 'right' to have the Executive observe the procedures required by law"). 39 But the Court denied that the invasion of such a congressionally created right was sufficient to support standing, holding that "there is absolutely no basis for making the Article III inquiry turn on the source of the asserted right." 40 It would violate the separation of powers, the Court concluded, "[t]o permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers' compliance with the law into an 'individual right' vindicable in the courts." 41 Lujan has been subject to extensive academic criticism, 42 but it was neither the last case in this line nor the first. Sixteen years later, the Court said the same thing in another case quite like Lujan, Summers v Earth Island Institute.
43
Summers was another environmental group's challenge to another procedural defect in another environmental regulation-this one concerning fire rehabilitation and timber salvage sales. Once again, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court rejected various theories of standing including one premised on Proposition A. The Court acknowledged that the challengers claimed to "have suffered procedural injury, namely that they have been denied the ability to file comments on some Forest Service actions," but concluded that "deprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation-a procedural right in vacuo-is insufficient to create Article III standing." 44 Then the Court explicitly denied Proposition A:
It makes no difference that the procedural right has been accorded by Congress. That can loosen the strictures of the redressability prong of our standing inquiry. . . . Unlike redressability, however, the requirement of injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute. 45 The Court has also found standing limits on Congress's ability to create enforceable rights in other cases, including in opinions not written by Justice Scalia. In Raines v Byrd the Court expanded Proposition B to create limits on congressional standing. In Raines 40 Id at 576. 41 Id at 577. Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion, which I discuss below.
several legislators wished to challenge the so-called Line Item Veto Act, which authorized the President to decline to spend money they had voted to appropriate. 46 As a prestatutory matter, it was somewhat debatable whether legislators had been personally injured when the consequence of their votes was illegally ignored. 47 But in Byrd there was once again an express statutory right to sue, specifically vested in "any Member of Congress" to enjoin the act as unconstitutional. 48 The That William Brown and Levi B. Gritts . . . and David Muskrat and J. Henry Dick . . . be, and they are hereby, authorized and empowered to institute their suits in the court of claims to determine the validity of any 46 Raines v Byrd, 521 US 811 (1997) . 47 Id at 820-29 & n 4 (discussing precedents). 48 Line Item Veto Act, § 3(a)(1), Pub Law No 104-130, 110 Stat 1200, 1211 (1996) . 49 Raines, 521 US at 820. 50 Id at 835 (Stevens, J, dissenting); id at 838-39 (Breyer, J, dissenting) ("As the majority points out, Congress has enacted a specific statute (signed by the President) granting the plaintiffs authority to bring this case. That statutory authorization eliminates any prudential standing limitations and significantly lessens the risk of unwanted conflict with the Legislative Branch. Congress, however, cannot grant the federal courts more power than the Constitution itself authorizes us to exercise."). acts of Congress passed since the said act of July first, nineteen hundred and two, in so far as said acts, or any of them, attempt to increase or extend the restrictions upon alienation, encumbrance, or the right to lease the allotments of lands of Cherokee citizens, or to increase the number of persons entitled to share in the final distribution of lands and funds of the Cherokees beyond those enrolled for allotment as of September first, nineteen hundred and two, and provided for in the said act of July first, nineteen hundred and two. 53 When Muskrat's case got to the Supreme Court, the Court acknowledged that "[t]his act is the authority for the maintenance of these two suits." 54 But it found that act, and its authority, unconstitutional under Article III.
The Court's reasoning was famously obscure. 55 It mentioned several earlier cases that had invalidated claims legislation where the adjudications would not be enforced without exercise of political discretion. 56 But the Muskrat statute made the Supreme Court's decision final 57 and so it did not raise this problem. Instead, the Court seemed to have two related complaints, both of which echo modern standing requirements. One was that the plaintiffs had been wrong to sue the United States, when their goal was "not to assert a property right as against the government, or to demand compensation for alleged wrongs because of action upon its part." 58 The other was that their suit was effectively a request for an advisory opinion about the constitutionality of the allotment statutes. 57 Muskrat, 219 US at 351, 361. 58 Id. 59 Id ("It is therefore evident that there is neither more nor less in this procedure than an attempt to provide for a judicial determination, final in this court, of the constitutional validity of an act of Congress"); id at 361-62 ("The whole purpose of the law is to determine the constitutional validity of this class of legislation, in a suit not arising between parties concerning a property right necessarily involved in the decision in question, but in a proceeding against the government in its sovereign capacity, and concerning which the only judgment required is to settle the doubtful character of the legislation in question").
In the end, even though Congress had attempted to give the plaintiffs a right to that adjudication, the Court found it violated Article III: "This attempt to obtain a judicial declaration of the validity of the act of Congress is not presented in a 'case' or 'controversy,' to which, under the Constitution of the United States, the judicial power alone extends," and hence "exceeded the limitations of legislative authority." 60 Muskrat thus shows that the Court's skepticism about the full force of Proposition A has deep roots. It may be tempting to distinguish both Raines and Muskrat as reflecting special separation-of-powers concerns, and therefore as not strictly relevant to the question of statutory rights and Article III standing. But this distinction is artificial. The Court has described its Article III standing doctrine generally as a doctrine of separation of powers.
61 To quote Raines itself: "'The law of Article III standing is built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of powers.'"
62
The Court has not expounded the two propositions about statutory rights in complete isolation from one another. Some of the Proposition B cases attempt to reconcile themselves with Proposition A. For instance, in Lujan, the Court stressed that "Nothing in this contradicts the principle that "[t]he . . . injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of 'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.'" 63 That principle, Lujan suggested, "involved Congress' elevating to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law." 64 Similarly, Justice Kennedy, who provided one of the five votes for the majority opinion in Lujan, added in a separate concurrence that: "As Government programs and policies become more complex and far reaching, we must be sensitive to the articulation of new rights of action that do not have clear analogs in our common-law tradition. . . . In my view, Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before, and I do not read the Court's opinion to suggest 60 Id at 361-62. 62 Raines, 521 US at 820 (quoting Allen v Wright, 468 US 737, 752 (1984)). 63 Lujan, 504 US at 578 (quoting Warth and Linda RS ). 64 Lujan, 504 US at 578. a contrary view." 65 He added that "[i]n exercising this power, however, Congress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit," and he did not think that Congress had done so in Lujan.
66 Still, as we will see, such acknowledgments have not prevented a conflict from arising between the two propositions.
c. the growing tension
While these two propositions have coexisted in standing case law for decades, the tension between them makes a simple question very hard to answer: When does a right created by Congress nonetheless fall below the "hard floor" of Article III jurisdiction? In the years leading up to Spokeo, the difficulty of that question became apparent.
That difficulty became salient in First American Financial Corp. v Edwards, 67 a case brought under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, which forbids kickbacks and revenue splits for those who settle regulated mortgage transactions.
68 These restrictions are designed to eliminate conflicts of interest among, for example, one's lender, one's real estate lawyer, and one's title insurer. The restrictions are backed by criminal penalties, 69 and also a civil cause of action that awards statutory damages "equal to three times the amount of any charge paid for such settlement service." 70 Denise Edwards bought a house in Cleveland with title insurance provided by First American, and then complained that First American had been the beneficiary of a referral agreement banned by the act. As a matter of law, her damages seemed to be $2,186.55, three times the amount that she and her settlement agent paid for the insurance. 71 But as a matter of reality, her damages seemed to be zero: Ohio law regulates the price and terms of title insurance, 72 so Edwards got exactly what she would have gotten in any event. First American might have profited from an illegal referral agreement, but Edwards did not suffer from it; the victims, if any, were First American's competitors.
Under established standing doctrine, the case presented a puzzle. On one hand, black letter law requires Edwards to have suffered an actual or imminent injury, and she was not in fact overcharged. So the case seems to fall below the "hard floor" of Article III. On the other hand, perhaps we can see her injury as being not her out-of-pocket costs, but the conflict of interest itself: Congress gave Edwards "a right to a conflict-free transaction," 73 and that right can be vindicated even if it is not an economic one, just as the right to live in legally integrated housing can be vindicated even if it is not an economic one either. And yet if Congress can define such an injury, what remains of Article III's "hard floor"?
The Ninth Circuit did not fully confront the problem, instead writing its opinion as if only the Proposition A cases existed:
"The injury required by Article III can exist solely by virtue of 'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.'" "Essentially, the standing question in such cases is whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff 's position a right to judicial relief." Thus, we must look to the text of RESPA to determine whether it prohibited Defendants' conduct; if it did, then Plaintiff has demonstrated an injury sufficient to satisfy Article III. 74 The first two quotations are true enough, but the last sentence does not quite follow. For as we have seen, while the Court has said that Congress can create legal rights that support standing, it has also sometimes said that it cannot-otherwise Summers and Lujan and Raines and even Muskrat would all be wrongly decided. The Ninth Circuit gave no explanation for invoking Proposition A while ignoring Proposition B.
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that the Supreme Court took an interest in the case. And at oral argument, it looked as if the Court was poised to continue expanding Proposition B beyond Lujan and Summers. For instance, the Chief Justice seemed to deny the existence of Proposition A altogether: You said violation of a statute is injury in fact. I would have thought that would be called injury in law. And when we say, as all our standing cases have, is that what is required is injury in fact, I understand that to be in contradistinction to injury in law. And when you tell me all that you've got or all that you want to plead is violation of the statute, that doesn't sound like injury in fact. 75 So too did Justice Alito: "[W]e are looking for whether there is an injury in fact. Put aside the question of whether there is a breach of the duty in law. There is allegedly here. I just don't see where there is an injury in fact." 76 And Justice Scalia described the plaintiff 's injury as "the vague notion of-of buying it from-from-I don't know, a white knight? Is-is that the kind of injury-in-fact that our cases talk about? . . . It seems to me purely-I don't know-philosophical." 77 Meanwhile, Justice Kennedy described Proposition A as "circular": "For you to say he was entitled to it and, therefore, it's an injury, that's just-that's just circular. That gives no substance at all to theto the meaning of the term 'injury.'" 78 And he later expressed skepticism specifically "that Congress can say that you have a right to buy a conflict-free title insurance policy."
79 It looked to observers as if the Court would reject a thorough endorsement of Proposition A, "under which no showing of injury is required simply because Congress has provided for statutory damages."
80
Then came an unexpected reprieve: on the last day of the Term, seven months after oral argument, the Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted. As is typical, the Court issued no explanation for the late abandonment of the case. The timing makes it unlikely that the Court had suddenly discovered a "vehicle problem"
81 -a procedural wrinkle or faulty premise that made it hard to reach the question presented. Rather, it seems that the Court had some difficulty answering the question. Perhaps a Justice changed his or her 75 First American Financial Corp. v Edwards, No 10-708, Supreme Court Oral Argument Transcript at 32-33. 76 Id at 29. 77 Id at 44. 78 Id at 47. 79 Id at 57. mind at the last minute; perhaps the Court's resources were stretched thin by the massive drafting exercise in NFIB v Sebelius (decided that day); 82 or perhaps the Justices simply regretted confronting one of the hardest questions in modern federal courts doctrine. Later that year, Pam Karlan suggested that "[a]s with . . . the significance of the French Revolution for western civilization-it may be too soon to tell." 83 As it happens, we did not have to wait long for the next sortie.
II. Spokeo's Attempted Answer
Last Term, the Court tried once again to make progress on the doctrinal problem it had created for itself. The vehicle was Spokeo v Robins, another consumer protection case arising out of the Ninth Circuit. 84 This time the consumer protection statute was the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which contains a range of substantive and procedural requirements for consumer reporting agencies, including the requirement that they "follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates."
85 It also gives a cause of action to consumers "with respect to [whom]" these requirements are violated, for $100-$1,000 in statutory damages.
86
The plaintiff was Thomas Robins, an unemployed, unmarried man living in Virginia. Like many of us, Mr. Robins was the subject of a consumer report on www.spokeo.com. And as with many of us, not all of that information was accurate. 87 But as in First American, even if these inaccuracies reflected a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, it was a little hard to say how they had actually injured Mr. Robins. Spokeo described him as richer and more educated than 82 94 Id at 413. 95 Id at 413-14. 96 Id (quoting Lujan at 578).
Once again, however, the Supreme Court was not satisfied. Justice Alito wrote an opinion for the Court reversing the Ninth Circuit and ordering a remand. It was joined by five other Justices, one of whomJustice Thomas-also wrote a separate opinion to which we will return. Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor dissented. (The new lineup shed little light on what had gone wrong in First American; and it is also possible that the case was reoriented when Justice Scalia died a few months after argument and (presumably) the drafting assignment.) 97 The fundamental tension between Proposition A and Proposition B was evident in the Court's opinion in Spokeo. From Proposition B cases, the Court repeated that "Congress cannot erase Article III's standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing," 98 and that "[i]n no event may Congress abrogate the Art. III minima." 99 And it denied that "a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right." 100 But in a nod to the Proposition A cases, the Court also acknowledged that "both history and the judgment of Congress play important roles. . . . because Congress is well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III requirements,"
To attempt to ease that tension, the Court's opinion made a narrow doctrinal innovation, though in the service of a broader, implicit theme of narrowing Proposition A. The narrow doctrinal innovation was to focus on asking whether the statutory injury was "concrete."
The word "concrete" had appeared in the Court's standing cases before. For instance, Lujan had described an "injury in fact" as being "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."
104 But the word had not before been given any independent definition or meaning in the Court's standing doctrine.
Prior to Spokeo, in the context of statutory rights, the requirement that the injury be "concrete" might have seemed to be effectively the same as the requirement of particularization. This had been Judge O'Scannlain's reasoning in the Ninth Circuit opinion below. He concluded that an injury is "concrete" so long as it is (1) an invasion of a legal right created by Congress, (2) personal, and (3) individualized. 105 The Supreme Court's opinion in Spokeo disagreed, concluding that "[c]oncreteness . . . is quite different from particularization."
106 The Court also concluded that not all legal injuries, and not all injuries to defined statutory rights, were concrete. 107 A statutory right required something more.
But as to what more, exactly, was required, the Court was somewhat mysterious. Citing dictionaries, it said that to be concrete an injury "must actually exist," and be "'real,' and not 'abstract. '" 108 And yet the harm could also nonetheless be "intangible" or based only on the "risk of real harm." 109 The Court did not explain, however, why some statutory rights are not "real," especially when some intangible harms apparently can be. After providing a few sentences of guidance for how to apply this new requirement to the Fair Credit Reporting 104 Lujan, 504 US 555, 560 (1992) (emphasis added; citations and quotation marks omitted). 105 Robins, 742 F3d at 413-14. 106 Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1548. 107 Id at 1549 ("Congress' role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right"). 108 Id at 1548 (quoting dictionaries).
Act itself, the Court remanded the case to the lower courts for further consideration.
110
As noted above, the broader message of the Court's opinion seemed to be a certain measure of skepticism about Proposition A, and a search for some additional rule for limiting Congress's ability to create private rights, the invasion of which supports standing. As I will discuss in a moment, that skepticism, and the Court's attempt to implement it, are understandable, but problematic.
There were two other opinions in Spokeo: Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissented, while largely following the majority's framework. Her dissent emphasized the Court's Proposition A cases 111 but also acknowledged the Proposition B cases.
112 She also read the concreteness requirement more narrowly and thought that Robins's complaint had already satisfied that requirement. 113 Justice Thomas, meanwhile, wrote a concurring opinion attempting to ground the Court's standing doctrine in historical principles differentiating public rights and private rights.
114 I will return to his view in Part IV.
III. The Problems with Spokeo's Answer
Taken seriously, both the larger and smaller implications of Spokeo are problematic. They cast doubt on standing in several different cases where standing seemed to be widely presumed. That is not to say that the majority's approach is obviously wrong. It may reflect just how difficult it is to find a principled way of reconciling the two long-standing propositions of the Court's case law.
a. nominal damages
The first problem with the Court's ruling in Spokeo is that it creates a tension with the basic notion of nominal damages. Nominal damages are damages in a trivial amount-a nominal sum-that allow a plaintiff to litigate important legal rights without seeking or litigating damages issues. As we have seen, nominal damages were available at common law for trespass claims, where the plaintiff mostly cared about establishing a property right, 115 or in libel cases where the plaintiff cared most about "brand[ing] the defamatory publication as false."
116 Nominal damages have been called "in many respects an early precursor to the declaratory judgment proceeding." 117 "[I]t has long been settled that a claimant may waive or forgo claims for compensatory and punitive damages and pursue nominal damages alone."
118 In more modern cases, the Court has specifically affirmed that nominal damages are available to compensate for the violation of legal rights. In Carey v Piphus, the Court concluded that "the denial of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury."
119 And in a later case the Court even went on to hold that an award of nominal damages is a sufficient victory to make a plaintiff eligible for attorneys fees (though they might not actually be awarded in all cases).
120
But it is hard to see how nominal damages are fully consistent with the logic of Spokeo. The very premise of nominal damages is that one cannot show any "actual injury" apart from the violation of the legal right itself. 121 Spokeo seems to require something more than just the violation of a legal right. The Spokeo opinion is ambiguous on this score, given its reference to concrete but "intangible" injuries, 122 but it is nonetheless at odds with the basic idea of nominal damages, whose very point is that nothing more concrete need be shown.
b. zivotofsky
Spokeo is also inconsistent with other causes of action that the Court has taken for granted as constitutional up until now. Consider, for instance, the statutory cause of action that the Court confronted the that "[f] or purposes of the registration of birth, certification of nationality, or issuance of a passport of a United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary shall, upon the request of the citizen or the citizen's legal guardian, record the place of birth as Israel." 124 The suit was brought in the name of a child, Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky, to vindicate his statutory right to a passport that said "Israel."
The Court ultimately concluded that the statute was unconstitutional, at least as applied to passports, because it infringed on the executive's power over foreign affairs. 125 But under the logic of Spokeo, it is not clear whether the Court should have gotten that far. Before the case reached the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit had been forced to confront the question of Zivotofsky's standing, and it had relied expressly on the broad form of Proposition A. It wrote:
The Supreme Court has recognized that "Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute." Or stated differently, "Congress may create a statutory right or entitlement the alleged deprivation of which can confer standing to sue even where the plaintiff would have suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the absence of statute." 126 As for the Proposition B cases, the D.C. Circuit understood them to be limited to having "qualified statutory standing in one respect," namely, the exclusion of "a generalized interest shared by all citizens in the proper administration of the law." 127 In other words, the D.C. Circuit's theory of standing in Zivotofsky tracked almost exactly the Ninth Circuit's theory of standing in Spokeo. If Spokeo is right, then it seems that Zivotofsky was wrong to reach the merits.
To be sure, the Supreme Court may not have focused on the standing question in Zivotofsky. contesting the issue of standing, though the government had contested it before losing on the issue in the D.C. Circuit. But courts have an obligation to consider standing questions on their own, and both an amicus brief 128 and some public commentary 129 pointed out the standing problems in Zivotofsky while it was pending in the Supreme Court. And the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Spokeo just six weeks before deciding Zivotofsky.
130 Nonetheless, none of the Justices in Zivotofsky acknowledged the standing problem, even though three of them joined the majority opinion in both that case and Spokeo.
Perhaps some members of the Court thought that standing in Zivotofsky was permissible because there was a concrete injury apart from the statutory right. But it is hard to see what that would be. One could perhaps imagine that some Section 214(d) claimants would suffer psychological harm from the treatment of their passports, and one can read Spokeo to treat psychological harms as sufficiently "concrete."
131 But, as the D.C. Circuit pointed out, at the time of its standing decision Menachem Zivotofsky was "only three years old" and any psychological harm seemed "conjectural."
132 What is more, standing is supposed to exist when the complaint is filed. 133 When the complaint in Zivotofsky was filed, Menachem was eleven months old. 134 It seems implausible that he had any psychological harm from the contents of his passport at that time.
Or perhaps one could characterize Zivotofsky's injury as expressive. Spokeo gave as examples of permissible "intangible injuries" violations of free speech and free exercise rights, 135 and one could see the right to put one's country of origin on one's passport as an expressive right. But that seems like a strained interpretation of the passport (and one that the majority in Zivotofsky indeed rejected). 136 Moreover, it simply raises the question why the abstract rights to engage in free speech and free exercise are "concrete" but the right to reasonable accuracy in Spokeo might not be.
One might dismiss the question of standing in Zivotofsky as a moot point. The Justices did not discuss the standing question, and therefore the case establishes no precedent on standing.
137 But the contrary treatment of standing in Zivotofsky and Spokeo suggests that there is something confused about the Court's intuitions in this area. Moreover, the question of standing in cases like Zivotofsky may well arise again, even under the very same statute. That is because Section 214(d) applies not only to passports but to consular reports of birth abroad. Justice Thomas expressly distinguished the two and argued that Congress has greater power to regulate the latter in light of its naturalization power. 138 And the majority expressly reserved the question because it had been waived. 139 Hence, if Jersusalem-born U.S. citizens wish to litigate the issue of consular birth reports, the courts will have to confront the standing question in light of Spokeo.
c. privacy
Finally, Spokeo has also raised questions about the enforcement of privacy statutes throughout the lower courts. In these cases, plaintiffs sue somebody who has illegally disclosed information about them; 135 Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1549. 136 For example, Zivotofsky, 135 S Ct at 2095 (describing "a passport's place-of-birth section as an official executive statement").
137 Arizona Christian School Tuition Org. v Winn, 563 US 125, 144 (2011) ("When a potential jurisdictional defect is neither noted nor discussed in a federal decision, the decision does not stand for the proposition that no defect existed."). 138 135 S Ct at 2109-11 ( Thomas, J, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 139 Id at 2083 ("The arguments in Zivotofsky's brief center on his passport claim, as opposed to the consular report of birth abroad. . . . He has . . . waived the issue here by failing to differentiate between the two documents. As a result, the Court addresses Zivotofsky's passport arguments and need not engage in a separate analysis of the validity of § 214(d) as applied to consular reports of birth abroad.").
they are then confronted with the question of whether illegal disclosure of information, without more, is a concrete injury under Spokeo. Remarkably, most courts have said "no." Taken seriously, this would imply constitutional limits on federal enforcement of privacy rights. This further demonstrates the implausibility of Spokeo.
For instance, last summer the D.C. Circuit confronted a lawsuit by two D.C. shoppers who complained that local clothing stores had demanded their zip codes in violation of local law. Without disputing that the information was illegally demanded, D.C. Circuit dismissed the case for lack of standing. 140 The forced disclosure of one's zip code, it held, was not a concrete injury after Spokeo. In Spokeo the Court had offered a coincidentally similar example, writing: "not all inaccuracies cause harm or present any material risk of harm. An example that comes readily to mind is an incorrect zip code. It is difficult to imagine how the dissemination of an incorrect zip code, without more, could work any concrete harm."
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The D.C. Circuit found the dictum apt, writing, "If, as the Supreme Court advised, disclosure of an incorrect zip code is not a concrete Article III injury, then even less so is [the plaintiffs'] naked assertion that a zip code was requested and recorded without any concrete consequence. [The plaintiffs] do not allege, for example, any invasion of privacy, increased risk of fraud or identity theft, or pecuniary or emotional injury." 142 This is probably the correct conclusion to draw from Spokeo's somewhat gratuitous discussion of zip codes, but at a more fundamental level it again suggests that something is wrong with Spokeo. Why must the plaintiffs show something like a risk of identity theft or emotional injury to demonstrate a concrete injury? Why can't an illegal disclosure itself be a concrete injury? As to a zip code, this may seem strange. But imagine that the illegal disclosure was something else-an unflattering photograph or email, perhaps. Surely this ought to be actionable without showing a subsequent consequence, like the loss of one's job or social standing. Or, more modestly, imagine somebody who is embarrassed by their middle name and does not wish to see it disclosed. If that person has a legal right against disclosure, why should they need anything more?
There are two possible ways to resolve the scope of privacy laws in light of the courts' position on zip codes. One possibility, the more aggressive one, is to conclude that illegal disclosure of facts about oneself is never itself a concrete injury. To sue over the disclosure of one's address, photos, name, or anything else, one would have to demonstrate some sort of downstream consequences from these disclosures. In other words, privacy itself would not be a protectable interest under Article III. This position has a certain logical purity, but one hopes that it is too implausible even for today's courts to adopt. It would mean that even injuries recognized under longstanding common law principles would not be enough to satisfy the "injury in fact" requirement.
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The alternative possibility, a more modest one, is that some illegal disclosures are injurious in themselves, and others are not. For instance, perhaps the disclosure of photographs is different in kind from the disclosure of zip codes, even if both are protected by legal right. (The D.C. Circuit's attempt to distinguish "invasion of privacy" as an actionable "concrete consequence" might point to this possibility.) 144 There is some common sense intuition behind this approach, but it is not entirely principled. If the legislature has made the judgment to protect both kinds of information, it is not at all clear why judges may decide that one is "concrete," that is, "real," and the other is not.
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This saves some of privacy law from Spokeo only by creating a constitutional common law of privacy interests.
Other post-Spokeo decisions in the lower courts reveal more ambiguity and troubling possibilities. For instance, in Braitberg v Charter Communications, the Eighth Circuit dismissed a lawsuit brought by a former customer complaining that his cable company had illegally retained some of his personal information in violation of federal law. The court concluded that illegally retaining personal information was not itself a harm for which Congress could authorize suit, suggesting once again that Article III might impose limits on federal privacy law. Like the D.C. Circuit, the Eighth Circuit tried to salvage some privacy law, by noting that in this case the defendant had not "disclosed the information to a third party" nor "used the information in any way during the disputed period."
147 This was relevant, said the court, because at common law, "the retention of information lawfully obtained, without further disclosure, traditionally has not provided the basis for a lawsuit in American courts."
148 This is somewhat reassuring for privacy law, but not entirely. In rejecting Congress's attempts to modestly expand the scope of personal informational rights in the Cable Communications Policy Act, the Eighth Circuit cast doubt on whether Congress can expand privacy rights beyond their common law scope at all. It is unclear why, in this area, Congress should not be allowed to protect interests beyond those protected by the common law, as it has been allowed in other cases.
On the other hand, the Third Circuit has taken the opposite lesson from Spokeo. In In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation, 149 the court concluded that statutory privacy claims automatically supply standing. Dealing with a class of consumers who alleged that Viacom had illegally disclosed children's web-browsing data to Google, the court wrote that while their harms were "perhaps 'intangible,'" they nonetheless presented "a clear de facto injury, i.e., the unlawful disclosure of legally protected information."
150 While the D.C. Circuit in Hancock thought the unlawful disclosure of legally protected information was not an injury without more-without some consequences flowing from that unlawful disclosure-the Third Circuit thought that the disclosure was itself the harm.
d. substantive due process all over again?
The purpose of reciting these problematic implications of Spokeo is not to show that Article III limits on statutory standing are obvi- 147 Id at 930. 148 Id. ously wrong. While there may once have been widespread academic skepticism of restrictions on Congress's plenary power to confer standing through statutory rights, 151 that power has been limited in several cases that seem well entrenched. But even accepting those limits, the conflict between the Court's two lines of standing doctrine raises tricky problems, and Spokeo does not do much to solve them.
Indeed, the Court's so far unsuccessful quest to define the limits of statutory standing is reminiscent of the path of another doctrinethat of substantive due process. This analogy has been made before by some critics of Proposition B's limits on statutory standing 152 who have said that it "uses highly contestable ideas about political theory to invalidate congressional enactments, even though the relevant constitutional text and history do not call for invalidation at all"
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-an analogy intended as "particular anathema to those members of the Court most anxious to tell us that there are Article III limitations on statutory grants of standing." 154 The analogy between standing limitations and substantive due process is an apt one, but in a more nuanced and sympathetic way than those critics may intend. The vagueness of Proposition B, illustrated by Spokeo, invites courts either to fashion constitutional limits out of nothing, or to say that only interests protected by the common law satisfy Article III requirements-both paths that have proven unworkable in the substantive due process context.
In a nutshell, one story of substantive due process's early rise is this: The Due Process Clause forbids deprivations of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law." 155 This was paradigmatically understood as a rule regulating the executive and judicial branches, requiring them to obey the positive law when their actions might injure a private person. 156 It might have been satisfying to conclude that the clause does not apply to the legislature at all-and seemingly consistent with due process's forebearer, the requirement that the government conform to "the law of the land." 157 But the clause could not easily ignore the legislature, for what if the legislature passed a statute saying that the executive branch could do whatever it wished and dispense with the courts? Or what if the legislature itself directly effected the deprivation? In order to prevent what seem like obvious evasions of the clause, it was logical to characterize those legislative actions, too, as deprivations of due process.
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Perhaps one could still hold the line by insisting that the requirement as applied to the legislature be strictly procedural: The legislature could create whatever substantive rules or liabilities it wished so long as they were adjudicated by a court and through "due" procedures. But regulations of substance can circumvent the requirements of process. What if, for example, the legislature passes a statute making it a crime to be on an officially maintained list of enemy combatants? One can have all of the process one likes, limited to the single element of the offense: whether one is on the list. The hypothetical is troubling because its substance makes procedure irrelevant.
And while courts did not confront exactly that hypothetical, they confronted other substantive regulations that seemed similar to them, such as a law providing for the one-time election of county clerks, 159 or a law prohibiting the sale of liquor, 160 and found them to violate due process principles. 161 These substantive rules came so close to evading the constitutionally required process that it seemed natural to invalidate them too. Thus due process expanded to include certain substantive constraints that supplement procedural due process, such as 157 the requirements that legislation authorizing deprivations be "general" or "prospective."
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But once one has started invalidating substantive regulations, it is easy to see how one slips into even more "substantive" applications of due process-whether a right to freedom of contract or a right to intimate decision making or what have you. Having abandoned the most formally stark principles, like the rule that due process does not apply to the legislature, or applies only to process and never to substance, the doctrinal category has tended to drift out into more open territory. And in this open sea, courts looking for landmarks instead drift to things like common-law tradition or their own ethical intuitions.
This is not to say that this evolution from formally procedural to broadly substantive due process is inevitable-on the contrary! Many jurists and scholars have put forward plausible theories about how and where the stopping line should have been drawn. But it is to say that it is easier than one might think to slip from formal procedural rules to quite substantive judge-made ones. And it is hard to draw a coherent, stable line in such an area by proceeding only in intuitive, case-by-case fashion.
Congressionally created standing has much the same character. It might have been satisfying to conclude that standing limitations do not apply to the legislature at all-but that would suggest that Congress could even go so far as to authorize federal courts to issue advisory opinions, whose illegality is supposedly one of the paradigm rules of Article III. It seemed natural enough, perhaps even necessary, to describe the legal right to an advisory opinion as violating the requirement of a "judicial" "case" or "controversy." This gives us Muskrat, the first of the standing cases supporting today's Proposition B.
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Even once standing doctrine has extended to limit legislatively created rights, one might attempt to limit that doctrine to a ban on advisory opinions. But courts saw in some procedural legal rights the same things that had concerned them about advisory opinions-the possibility of courts being asked to adjudicate only "[t]he public's nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the laws." 164 And once courts have started invalidating such statutory rights, it is easy to see how they might keep going. The rule that all federal legal rights can be vindicated in federal court has been replaced with a judicial limitation on which legal rights are sufficiently real to be judicially enforced. Such judicial limitation is not inherently flawed, but the Court has not fully understood the problem it is trying to solve, and so it has not deployed a solution that is likely to solve it.
The concept of "concreteness" does not do much to resolve these problems. Nor does it help to rephrase that term, as Spokeo does, into a judicial inquiry into which injuries, including "intangible" ones, are nonetheless "real."
165 What makes some rights "real" enough to justify nominal damages, and others insufficiently real to justify the statutory damages available under the Fair Credit Reporting Act? What makes the word "Israel" on Menachem Zivotofsky's passport more concrete than the word "married" on Robins's Spokeo profile? What makes the zip code disclosed in Hancock less concrete than the internet cookie disclosed in Nickelodeon?
The way to make the concept of "intangible" yet "real" injury coherent is to say that only injuries recognized in some form by the common law will suffice. But this is a position that the Court has (rightly) rejected, and it is one that is not really reconciled to a postLochner world. The inquiry in Spokeo looks, at best, like an effort to identify the subset of statutory rights that vaguely resemble the common law. That inquiry is both indefinite, but more importantly, misguided. So while the doctrinal problem faced in Spokeo is a genuinely tricky one, the Court's attempted answer should be classified as a misstep.
IV. Justice Thomas's Alternative
One Justice on the Spokeo Court seemed to see the problem. Justice Thomas, who joined the majority opinion in full, wrote a 164 Lujan, 504 US at 580 (Kennedy, J, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part). 165 Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1548-49. See also Re, 102 Georgetown L J at 1203 (cited in note 163) (arguing that because of the failure of the concept of adequate factual injury, "the Court has adopted a 'standard' for factual injury defined only by a list of synonymous adjectives").
concurring opinion that put forward a proposed rule that is both theoretically and historically consistent and that may provide a way to reconcile the tension between Proposition A and Proposition B. Justice Thomas's opinion built off of insightful articles by Andrew Hessick 166 and by Ann Woolhandler and Caleb Nelson. 167 While Justice Thomas's argument may need to be articulated more fully in the future, here are the essential parts:
The fundamental inquiry that standing derives from is who is a "proper party" to a given lawsuit. Having the so-called proper party is an independent requirement for judicial cognizance of a case. 168 Most importantly, the "proper party" for bringing a lawsuit depends very much on whether the suit is one to vindicate public rights or private rights. Public rights are owed "to the whole community, considered as a community, in its social aggregate capacity," 169 such as "free navigation of waterways, passage on public highways, and general compliance with regulatory law." 170 Public rights can most paradigmatically be vindicated by the government itself. 171 But they can also be vindicated by private people if those people suffered "special damage" that distinguishes them from other members of the public. 172 By contrast, private rights are those "belonging to individuals, considered as individuals," 173 such as "rights of personal security (including security of reputation), property rights, and contract rights." 174 They can be vindicated by the holders of those private rights regardless of what kind of damage they had suffered. These include the instances of nominal damages and trespass without injury discussed earlier. 175 Put together, these two principles led Justice Thomas to the conclusion that Proposition A controlled in private rights cases, while Proposition B controlled in public rights cases:
Congress can create new private rights and authorize private plaintiffs to sue based simply on the violation of those private rights. A plaintiff seeking to vindicate a statutorily created private right need not allege actual harm beyond the invasion of that private right. A plaintiff seeking to vindicate a public right embodied in a federal statute, however, must demonstrate that the violation of that public right has caused him a concrete, individual harm distinct from the general population. Thus, Congress cannot authorize private plaintiffs to enforce public rights in their own names, absent some showing that the plaintiff has suffered a concrete harm particular to him. 176 This position has several virtues. It is consistent with the historical antecedents of standing doctrine, and also basically consistent with the Court's invocations of Propositions A and B. Under this theory, the Proposition A cases are generally correct because Congress had in those cases created a private right, which can be enforced by the holder of that right without anything more. 177 Meanwhile, Lujan and Summers and Muskrat and Raines-the Proposition B cases-are correct because they all involve the enforcement of a public right, namely, that of "general compliance with regulatory law." 178 I am not certain that this position is sound, but it is plausible and generally consistent with history and doctrine, and it provides an actual attempt at a way forward. The historical categories of public and private rights, though not of crystalline purity, seem more workable and more apt than the Court's struggle to define some injuries as "real" and "concrete." By focusing the inquiry on the distinction between public and private rights, Justice Thomas helps us see that the question is not about whether the injury matches some platonic class of real injuries, but rather about whether Congress has given the right a particular form-a form that matches the judicial function in resolving it.
To be sure, Justice Thomas's position, and the scholarship on which he relied, does not fully resolve an important and hard question: Under what circumstances can Congress privatize a previously public right? When and how can Congress convert a legal duty that might traditionally have seemed public into a private one? 179 Answering this question will be important to know whether a new statutory right should be classed with the cases under Proposition A or Proposition B.
It seems to me that Justice Thomas's approach could yield at least two plausible answers to this question, one more restrictive of Congress's power and one more generous. Under the more restrictive approach, one might say that private rights must take a particular form. For instance, at one point Justice Thomas deployed a quotation from Tennessee Electric Power v TVA, 180 implying that a private right must have one of four specific forms. 181 It must be "'a legal right,-one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege. '" 182 These categories exclude the Proposition B cases. None of them were rights of property or contract. The "procedural right" at issue in Lujan and Summers was not a "privilege," at least if that term is used in the Hohfeldian sense of being "the opposite of a duty, and the correlative of a 'no-right.'" 183 It did not give its holders the privilege to do anything, other than sue to enforce the duty it imposed on the government. 184 Nor was it "protected from tortious invasion,"
